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BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE

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Briefly Noted

1. Soviet Scientists on the Danger of Nuclear Tests. For the information of those who are not already aware of its existence, the Soviets issued a booklet in 1958 (and later editions) entitled "Soviet Scientists on the Danger of Nuclear Tests." For obvious reasons connected with their resumption of atmospheric testing, they are no longer circulating this publication and are reported to have removed it from bookstores in the USSR. We, on the other hand, can use it not only to document the dangers of the fallout they are creating, but also to reveal the duplicity of their peace propaganda. We can ask such rhetorical questions as "Do the Soviets still believe that tests are so dangerous, and if so why did they resume testing in the atmosphere?" or "Why have the Soviets suppressed this booklet?" If the United States is forced to test in the atmosphere at a later date, we can suggest that the dangers described in this booklet must have been exaggerated, since the Soviets themselves ignored them. The articles in the booklet are at once somewhat technical and highly propagandistic, so that the material is best given to sophisticated readers or to capable assets for popularized interpretation. Further copies of the booklet are available.

2. Ulbricht's Concentration Camp. We wish to direct attention to an article, "Ulbricht's Concentration Camp", which appeared in the Vienna Arbeiter-Zeitung, 12 September 1961 (See Press Comment, 29 Sep 61), and came to the attention of the Director. This is an excellent short attack on Walter Adolfevich Ulbricht, as the East German amateur architect is named in the cadre files of the Central Committee of the CPSU (see Book Dispatch #1133, 17 March 1959, and attachment for a more complete expose on Ulbricht's career). Some of the Arbeiter-Zeitung statements are based on an article which Ulbricht wrote during the period of the Nazi-Soviet Pact (and which is not included in Ulbricht's three volume collected works, Zur Geschichte der Deutschen Arbeiterbewegung): "Hilferding on 'The Meaning of the War,'" printed in Stockholm in the German Communist exile journal, Die Welt, 9 February 1940. We have obtained the original text of this Ulbricht article and have reproduced it in Press Comment, 29 Sep 1961. In the translation, we have marked certain passages as particularly suitable for our use; the underlining, however, follows the italics in the original.

In his book, European Communism, pp. 249-250, Franz Borkenau quotes certain passages in Ulbricht's 1940 article (his quotations correspond with page 23, last three sentences of third paragraph, page 25, last four sentences of third paragraph, and page 26, second sentence in the third paragraph in our Press Comment translation) and comments as follows:

The full shame of this document can only be brought out by some reading between the lines. The 'Thyssen clique', in the above-quoted article, simply stands for all anti-Nazi forces (witness that the communists also subjected the conservative and socialist anti-Nazi groupings to constant attacks), and

the request to expose them can only mean that the German workers should 'expose' the enemies of Nazism, especially in the army and in the civil service. That desire--materializing during that period in the cooperation between the Gestapo and the NKVD--ties up with the formula, used a little further above, about the struggle against 'reaction'; a formula which, to the unsuspecting reader, may seem a residue from Popular Front days. Actually, the fight against 'reaction' was one of Goebbels' pet ideas, and his struggle against the old ruling class and its influence in business, the army and the civil service was, as has since been revealed by dramatic events and ample documentation, very real. The Ulbricht article, therefore, was not simply pro-German in a vague and merely propagandist sense. It contained an offer of cooperation with the 'anti-capitalist' wing of the Nazi party against the German High Command (then still under the influence of the conservatives) and, of course, against the West.

Finally, we would also like to call attention to another anti-Ulbricht article, "The Drive for Power," Die Wochen-Presse, Vienna, 2 Sep 61 (Press Comment, 22 September 1961).

436. Soviet Pressure on CENTO Countries

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Background: During recent weeks, the USSR has noticeably increased its pressure on Middle East members of CENTO (the Central Treaty Organization): Iran, Turkey and Pakistan. For all three countries, the recent increase in pressure has largely been connected with Soviet publication of classified documents of the (former) Baghdad Pact, CENTO's predecessor, apparently acquired following Qasim's 1958 revolution in Iraq. (NOTE: The U. S. Government has not publicly admitted the authenticity of the documents). Soviet Persian-language broadcasts have stressed alleged Baghdad Pact plans for nuclear attacks on the USSR and an "atomic death zone" in Iran. Continuing the long-standing Soviet condemnation of Iran, the Soviet Ambassador in Tehran has threatened to intervene under the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 unless Iran abandons CENTO. The treaty, which is regarded by the Iranians as no longer valid, is still maintained by the Soviets to contain certain provisions (initially designed to permit the Bolsheviks to take action against any counter-revolutionary forces which might be established on Iranian soil) allowing the USSR the right to intervene against any "aggressive forces" in Iran. Further, in spite of objections by the Turkish Government, the USSR has endeavored to propagandize in Turkey documents on the basis of which the Soviets charge the CENTO alliance with aggressive intentions. It is questionable what the Soviets hope to achieve in directing such accusations at Turkey, also a member of NATO and long as much (or more) anti-Russian as it is anti-Soviet, unless it is simply the desire to exacerbate existing tensions. In addition, the Soviet press and radio have claimed the existence of a patently false Baghdad Pact document which proposes the partition of Afghanistan between Pakistan and Iran, to threaten Pakistan with massive Soviet support for Afghanistan -- currently undergoing another period of severely strained relations with Pakistan over the long-lasting "Pushtunistan" issue. As far as Iran is concerned, the Kremlin has apparently never forgiven the Shah for initiating and subsequently breaking off negotiations for a non-aggression pact with the USSR in 1959. The Soviet press and radio have continued their vitriolic campaign against Iran, the fall of whose government in the not too distant future even Khrushchev has repeatedly predicted. It is not clear whether the Soviets are using the occasion of the major distraction of the Berlin issue with the free world to increase pressure on the Middle East CENTO powers under the impression that they can do so at present with relative immunity; or perhaps the pressure in this part of the world is being used by the Soviets in order to partially divert the attention of the free world from Berlin.

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437. The United States Disarmament Plan Presented to the World

Background: For years, before World War II as well as after it, nations have discussed disarmament. Sometimes this discussion seems to have a quality of unreality; as was pointed out in Guidance #373, arms do not cause friction, they result from friction. Nevertheless, as was also pointed out, an arms race can have fatal consequences, one side trying to out-arm the other until the point may be reached when the safest course appears to be to launch a "pre-emptive" or "preventive" attack. (The distinction between "pre-emptive" or "preventive" attack is that the former is supposed to take place only if there are concrete reasons for believing that the enemy is currently preparing to act; the difference, however, is likely to be non-existent in practice.) This danger is very serious in this age of nuclear weapons, particularly when nuclear capabilities may spread to additional countries. In view of the danger, the United States has advanced new and far-reaching disarmament proposals. These proposals represent an effort to make disarmament a practical, workable proposition.

Generally, the principal innovation in the US proposals is the adoption of the idea, supported by France in the 1932 discussions, of strengthening the machinery to keep the peace in a disarmed world. This is to be accomplished by generally strengthening the UN peace-keeping machinery as well as establishing an International Disarmament Organization to inspect and verify the agreements reached, a UN peace observation group for investigating threatening situations, and in later stages, a permanent international peace (or police) force under the UN. The establishment of an International Disarmament Organization is not new, in that it reflects what has been ever since 1946 a basic US position, the position that disarmament cannot be taken "on faith" but must be inspected. But the recognition of the need for positive international control to maintain peace when countries have disarmed is a new policy for the United States. Those who take the long view will doubtless see in this the continuation of the American evolution away from isolation and towards acceptance of international, UN authority.

Aside from the idea of expanding peace-keeping machinery in phase with disarmament, the American plan stresses the following principal points:

1. The control machinery shall verify what forces have been retained as well as what has been destroyed or eliminated.
2. Disarmament shall proceed by stages, with the completion of an earlier stage being verified before a succeeding stage is entered into.
3. Although efforts shall continue without interruption until a total disarmament program is achieved, immediate piecemeal measures, such as a controlled ban on nuclear testing, a ban on testing in outer space, and a cut-off in the production of nuclear weapons, can be put into effect without waiting for complete agreement on an over-all disarmament plan.

Summing up, the US proposes that, first, there should be immediate disarmament action; second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to

effective international controls; and third, adequate peace-keeping machinery must be established.

A plan of course is one thing; an agreement, in this case involving many countries, is something else. The USSR and its satellites, learning that the US was to present a new proposal, broke off the last general disarmament negotiations on 27 June 1960, the Polish acting chairman of the meeting refusing to recognize Western representatives so that they might speak, by declaring the meeting and the conference ended. This action was unprecedented in the annals of international conferences. The UN in the fall of 1960 requested the negotiating states, when negotiations resume, to work toward "general and complete disarmament." In an effort to resume negotiations, talks took place between McCloy and Zorin last summer (with UN approval) to establish (1) agreement on principles, and (2) agreement on the make-up of a disarmament conference.

A step forward was achieved when the two sides agreed on a set of principles to guide the negotiators in their work. The US agreed to work without interruption toward "general and complete disarmament" in negotiations, while the Soviet Union accepted (1) the need for building a strong UN peace-keeping machinery as disarmament progresses; (2) the concept of disarmament by stages, with each stage being verified before proceeding to the next; and (3) the idea of agreeing on and carrying out individual measures before reaching agreement on a total program. We may wonder if the Soviet agreement to the American draft statement embodying these points was sincere, particularly with respect to the last one; they can always block action at a later stage, and were perhaps under some pressure, due to the bad publicity they were getting from their nuclear test resumption, to make some conciliatory move. In any case, there was one sentence of the American draft which they would not accept, even for the sake of appearances: this sentence provided that the verification of disarmament "should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage." This is a very vital matter, since the mere scrapping of arms could be very deceptive; what counts is being able to verify that armaments remaining are at agreed levels. As a case in point, the Communist war-time guerrilla organization in Greece, ELAS, undertook to stack arms and actually turned in thousands of weapons, but then, at a critical moment, started a bloody civil war with the arms it had secretly retained. The Soviets claim, of course, that inspection of remaining forces would constitute espionage. But dsarmament without it would be a farce.

On the question of who should participate in disarmament negotiations which ended so unceremoniously in June 1960 involved 10 nations, 5 from the Soviet bloc and 5 from the West. But in March 1961, the Soviets called for participation in any future negotiations by 15 nations, adding five neutrals; this is an application of the "troika" principle, and also a propaganda move to win neutral support. The United States in reply has made several suggestions, ranging from the original 10 members to the whole membership of the UN. The preferred US solution is to add 10 other nations drawn from the major geographical areas of the world, making a total of twenty: the nations proposed are India, Japan, UAR,

Pakistan, Nigeria, Tunisia, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Sweden.

Six months ago there was widespread hope in the US that the Soviet Union, if only in its own interest, would participate in genuine negotiations for disarmament. Events since, particularly the Soviet conduct in the nuclear test ban discussions and in resuming nuclear testing in the atmosphere, have made these hopes evaporate. But all along, the Soviets have cynically used the issue of disarmament to attain various short term ends: they identify uncontrolled disarmament with peace, they stigmatize every attempt to approach the problem responsibly as obstructionism or espionage, they appeal to the vanity and fuzzy idealism of those who bear no responsibility for world security, they constantly accuse the west of bad faith and of planning a nuclear attack, and they generally regard the issue as a means of weakening and disuniting the west. The following points must constantly be borne in mind:

1. Disarmament is not identical with peace unless it is accompanied with effective peace-keeping machinery.

2. Disarmament is meaningless unless it signifies that there is a proportional reduction of arms on all sides; the country with five tanks can defeat the country with none.

3. The fact of disarmament must be established and verified, like a scientific fact; it cannot be taken on faith.

4. The proof of a country's readiness to disarm is its willingness to negotiate in line with the above principles; a call to one's opponent to disarm is not a contribution to peace unless one is ready to disarm oneself. Neither is it a contribution to peace when those who bear no responsibility propose the unilateral disarmament of governments that do bear it; their proposals can only influence the governments that are responsive to public or world opinion, weakening them in the face of those who, exactly because they are not responsive, are least scrupulous in the use of force.

The value of the American proposals is not destroyed by the dark prospects of the present moment. Aside from the hope that world tensions may someday ease and that the Soviets may take a more reasonable position, disarmament is only one of two sides to the American plan; the other side is the reinforcement of means for maintaining peace. Logically, disarmament and peace-keeping machinery must go hand in hand. This entails, among other things, the maintenance of a strong UN Secretariat. If the American plan serves no other purpose than to point this out to the world, it will have accomplished something.

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438. The Soviet Union is not Invulnerable

Background: Khrushchev has been seeking to magnify some successful rocket shots and space probes into an image of an invincible Soviet colossus. With wildly exaggerated propaganda, he has tried to convince the world that the Soviet Union has outdistanced the West, and is now so powerful that all must accept its dictates. In the midst of all the sound and fury, little attention was given to the US firing of Mercury-Atlas IV around the world on 13 September, with a payload weight of 2,700 lbs. (including a dummy astronaut), and a total weight in orbit of 11,300 lbs. Soviet propaganda still claims that the heaviest US satellite weighed only 500 lbs. The first test flight of the US Saturn booster is scheduled for 13 October, and this rocket is expected to be capable of lifting 20,000 lbs. into orbit, larger than anything orbited by the Soviets. A second generation Saturn being developed is expected to more than double this lift capability, while plans are being made for an even larger vehicle, called the Nova, capable of going to the moon and back. It will thus be seen that the capability of lifting large loads, with its connotation of military/nuclear potential, is not a Soviet monopoly. Soviet leaders have also boasted much of their multi-megaton bombs, but the US has developed a wide range of nuclear weapons for actual military use, not for propaganda, and in his speech to the UN on 26 September, Gromyko made the admission (in order to justify Soviet test resumption) that "On the whole the Western powers have conducted many more test explosions than the Soviet Union has."

Khrushchev and the CPSU cadres might profitably recall the history of World War II. Possibly they have forgotten the fact, always concealed in Soviet propaganda, that when the attack began, Soviet divisions outnumbered German by approximately 3 to 2. Yet the Germans advanced during the first month at the rate of 20 miles a day. During 1941, the Germans took at least 2,000,000 Soviet prisoners, and the Soviets lost over 19,000 tanks. Losses on this scale, especially the millions of prisoners, indicate that many of the troops simply surrendered without fighting. And in fact many soldiers, especially from minority groups, came over to the Germans in droves, Bielorrussians asked to fight on the German side, and whole regiments of Cossacks deserted to the enemy. Not only enlisted men and subalterns, but high-ranking officers, including Timoshenko's chief of staff, went over to the Germans. Stalin was saved by winter, by Hitler's mystical belief that it was more important to destroy "Leningrad and Stalingrad, the breeding grounds of Bolshevism," than Moscow, and eventually by lend-lease. (See attachment)

By postponing his attack on Moscow in August 1941, after going two-thirds of the way, Hitler missed his chance to seize the center of Soviet communications and government, and much of Soviet industry. Under a state planning system, many things must be centrally administered that under a private enterprise system would be simply and directly settled between the parties immediately concerned; a "socialist" state is therefore more vulnerable to disruption resulting from an enemy attack on its capital than is the case with a capitalist country. Moscow was the most vital point for the Soviet Union (despite the flight of the top echelons), for whose defense they would have committed most of their remaining

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forces. A successful encircling operation here, such as was performed instead at Kiev, would have meant practically the end of effective, organized Red Army resistance. Stalin might perhaps have retreated further eastward, but a weakened Soviet Union might also have attracted a Japanese attack.


Let us suppose that war breaks out between East and West today. Nuclear devastation would be very serious for us. But what matters most to Khrushchev is the effect of our counter-attack on his country. It would be possible for the U.S. with existing weapons to devastate the major Soviet cities, particularly Moscow which was not seriously damaged during World War II; in doing so we could deliver a crushing blow to the Soviet power structure, which is still highly centralized on the party side if less so in terms of current state organization. Soviet transport still depends almost entirely on railroads which, like the telecommunication net, center on the capital. A hasty evacuation of 300,000 people, such as took place when Hurricane Carla struck the Texas coast a few weeks ago, would be impossible to carry out in the USSR. Moreover, fallout or crop damaging BW weapons could well destroy the Soviet food supply, for which (unlike the American) there is no significant reserve. Since there is a shortage of population remaining even today from World War II (see Guidance #318), the Soviet Union would then face a vastly more populous China with depleted manpower and without its present technical advantages. Even supposing that the Soviet ground forces were able to advance to the English Channel, there would still exist the problem of policing the conquered areas; Communist organizations in the West would be as disrupted and decimated as the rest of West European society. What would happen in Eastern Europe is suggested by the revolts in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary, and the continued unpopularity of Communism is demonstrated by Ulbricht's prison wall. Finally, Soviet forces would still be thousands of miles from the shores of their principal opponent.

This survey of the prospects suggests that Khrushchev can hardly wish to launch a general war if he is still capable of rational thinking. Presumably he hopes to attain his aims by slow penetration. But this is not necessarily rewarding either. The Korean War was in effect a military defeat for Communism, since it aroused the U.S. and led to greatly increased military expenditures in this country which have never returned to pre-Korean levels. A Soviet challenge in Berlin might lead to a U.S. counter-attack, but would be much more likely to result in increased U.S. armament, including civil defense, limited war forces, and increased nuclear attack capability, while also tightening and strengthening NATO. As Herman Kahn wrote in 1960: "This would mean that as in Korea, even if we lost Berlin in the military sense, the Russians would have lost their particular campaign. While Berlin is important ethically and politically, its loss would not compare to the greatly increased power and reserve on the side of the West." Since Kahn wrote the foregoing, Soviet policy has indeed begun to produce this result, and if "successful," would do it much more thoroughly.

Rome was never built in a day, or even in a short series of five year plans. The history of human affairs is full of examples of the speculator who, building on a narrow foundation of success, attempts to create grandiose paper empires. As he progresses, he is forced to store up his credit with even-more-frantic claims and falsifications. In finance, we have had John Law's Bubble and the Southsea Bubble in 1719, the English "Railway Mania" of 1847, the French Panama scandal (when scores of deputies were bought to keep their mouths shut), the Florida real estate boom in the 1920's, and the fantastic career of Ivar Kreuger. In politics, there have been such figures as John Wilkes, Aaron Burr, General Boulanger, and Senator McCarthy. Sooner or later, the public awakens to the lack of substance, and the house of cards tumbles to the ground. Is this not perhaps what fate has in store for N.S. Khrushchev? As Lincoln said,

"It is true that you can fool all of the people some of the time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time, but you can't fool all the people all of the time."

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9 October 1961

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439. CUBA: The Decline and Fall of the Cuban Revolution


~~Character of Castro's Regime~~

Background: When Fidel Castro started his struggle against the regime of Fulgencio Batista, the majority of Cubans firmly believed that Castro was dedicated to the overthrow of a dictatorship in order to bring freedom and justice to the oppressed and backward people of Cuba. His advent also promised the introduction of badly needed social and economic reforms in the country. Unfortunately, neither the intellectuals nor the social reformers were sufficiently wary. In the euphoria of the period immediately following the victory of the 26th of July Movement, they permitted Che Guevara, Raul Castro, Blas Roca, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and other Communist leaders to usurp the ideals of "Castroism" and use Castro as a figurehead behind whom they could quietly take over complete control of the country. Consequently, sincere believers in "Castroism," sincere patriots whose only purpose was to carry out badly needed reforms in the wake of an oppressive regime and who had placed their faith in Castro as their leader, can only rue the day when they dropped their guard and ceased to maintain their vigilance and thus lost that for which they had suffered and fought.

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9 October 1961

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440. Communist Peace Propaganda and Soviet Resumption of Nuclear Testing

Background: On 30 August last, the USSR abruptly announced the resumption of nuclear weapons testing, punctuating the announcement by setting off a nuclear explosion the very next day. The long, rambling, apologetic and contradictory announcement argued that the action was necessitated by threatening military moves of the Western powers, but did not specify what those moves were. Since the announcement, the USSR has set off fifteen nuclear explosions, all of them in the atmosphere. It has furthermore announced a series of long-range rocket firings into the Pacific and has fired at least three, with an approximate range of 7,500 miles.

During the month of September, radio-active fallout reached a record high and has been detected in many parts of the globe, evoking serious protests and warnings from many sources both scientific and lay. By way of contrast, the resumption of small, underground nuclear tests by the US in early September has caused but little comment and has produced no fallout. The Soviet announcement came on the eve of the Belgrade Conference of uncommitted nations and just prior to the resumption at Geneva of talks on the banning of nuclear testing. It also abruptly terminated a campaign of "peaceful coexistence" amongst nations, for which the USSR and Communist parties over most of the world had been beating the drums for years, and which had gained much support from neutralists, pacifists and fellowtravellers and in addition many people genuinely interested in serious efforts to prevent the outbreak of war, to promote true disarmament and to abolish nuclear weapons.

The action taken by the Soviets is directly contrary to their frequent and solemn undertaking not to resume nuclear weapons testing unless the Western powers first resumed testing on their own. Indeed, as late as mid-August, at the Seventh World Conference against A and H Bombs meeting in Tokyo, both the Soviet and the Chinese Communist delegates joined in a unanimous resolution stating that "the first government to resume tests should be denounced as the enemy of peace and mankind." Moreover, atmospheric testing runs directly counter to the 1958 grave warnings concerning fallout by the Academy of Science of the USSR, published in a pamphlet and presumably widely distributed. Other statements of Soviet scientists have reiterated the perils to Russians as well as all other people inherent in atmospheric testing.

Throughout the Cold War, the Communist "peace campaign" has won the support of many non-Communist groups and individuals in the West and elsewhere, who oppose modern war in any form and who sincerely believe large-scale warfare would be fatal to civilization because of the inevitable utilization of nuclear weapons. There are also those groups and individuals who, motivated by witting support of the USSR, fear of opposing the USSR, or fuzzy belief in the sincerity of Soviet protestations, have gone along with this as with other Communist propaganda campaigns.

At the same time, changes in Soviet tactics and abrupt and unexplained reversals of policy have again confused and disheartened Communists and Communist Parties outside of Russia, as witness the consternation created by

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Chairman Khrushchev's abrupt denunciation of Stalin. Even more importantly, the USSR's callous abandonment from time to time of its policy of "peaceful coexistence" has shocked many individuals and groups, who had supported such a Soviet line in all sincerity, into open protest and denunciation, as witness the impact of the brutal suppression of the Hungarian and East German revolts, and the current sealing off of the border between East and West Berlin, which has even involved shooting would-be escapees.

The current Soviet announcement and concurrent actions have aroused a new storm of protest, especially violent amongst those organizations genuinely desiring an ending to nuclear testing and the threat of nuclear warfare, such as Lord Bertrand Russell's Committee of 100, Canon Collins Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, the Peace Marchers, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, the Iranian Association for Afro-Asian Cooperation, the Confederation Chretienne des Syndicats Malagaches, Japan's Zenro Seaman's Union and affiliated fishing associations, the Ghanian Council for Nuclear Disarmament. Norman Cousins and Linus Pauling were outspoken in their condemnation. Even Corliss Lamont, whose status vis-a-vis the US is doubtful, expressed his disillusionment. In New Delhi, more than 500 from the ranks of non-Communist Trade Union members but under the leadership of the National Marxist Association of India demonstrated in front of the Soviet Embassy. Harrison Salisbury reported in the New York Times of 15 September that this sudden about-face caused alarm and confusion at the Eighth Conference on Disarmament and World Security, meeting at Stowe, Vermont and attended by Soviet scientists. There is reason to believe that this sudden reversal has caught many Communists and Communist parties completely by surprise, causing confusion in their ranks and renewed doubts or misgivings concerning the wisdom of Moscow's decisions.

The recently announced program for the 22nd Congress of the CPSU, convening in Moscow in October, specifically reiterates the now familiar Soviet line that the downfall of capitalism is inevitable and imminent and states that the growing strength of Communist and anti-war forces in the world "actually makes it possible to banish world war from the life of society." Such a position is clearly vitiated by the threat of nuclear war implicit in the Soviet resumption of nuclear testing and by Soviet bellicosity on Berlin and other crisis areas.

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441. TIBET: Forthcoming Events of Propaganda Significance

Background: A review of both Communist bloc and free world media output in recent months reveals that the problem of Tibet has commanded little attention. It is true that no outstanding, i. e. "newsworthy", event has focused attention on Tibet. Consequently, Communist China's continued oppression and occupation of Tibet have received only passing attention and a major Communist vulnerability has become partially submerged. Outlined below are at least three (3) current topics directly related to Tibet which provide opportunities for us to call attention to Tibet in the coming weeks:

(1) Question of Tibet on UNGA Agenda: On 25 September 1961 the 16th UN General Assembly adopted an agenda item on the Question of Tibet as proposed by Malaya and Thailand. Valerian A. Zorin, the Soviet Union's chief delegate, contested the inscription of the item emphasizing that the Assembly had no authority to debate the matter. He maintained that Tibet was an integral part of Communist China and thus could not be discussed without the presence of a delegation from Peiping. In proposing the item which was finally adopted by a vote of 48 to 14, with 35 abstentions, Malaya and Thailand noted that the situation in Tibet today has not improved and remains a source of grave concern and expressed the hope that renewed consideration of the question will pave the way for restoration of religious and civil liberties of the Tibetan people. The Peiping Regime was quick to demonstrate its sensitivity to the inscription of Tibetan Question on the UNGA agenda. On 28 September NCNA called it a United States plot to discredit China at a time when it is seeking the restoration of its legitimate rights in the UN. Calling Malaya and Thailand US stooges and regretting that Britain, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden were among those voted for inclusion of the item on the agenda, the Peiping commentator noted that "as everybody knows, Tibet is China's territory." The quelling of the Tibetan reactionaries rebellion and the conducting of the Democratic reforms for which the Tibetan people have longed for ages are completely the internal affairs of China."

It will be recalled that the co-sponsors, in placing the same item on last years' 15th UNGA agenda, pointed out that from all indications, the Chinese Communists had ignored the appeal of the 14th UNGA to respect the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people. This appeal of the 14th General Assembly took the form of a resolution adopted 21 October 1959 by a vote of 45 to 9, with 26 abstentions. As might be expected the 9 votes against were cast by the Soviet bloc. The resolution read as follows:

The General Assembly,
Recalling the principles regarding fundamental human rights and freedoms set out in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948,

Considering that the fundamental human rights and freedoms to which the Tibetan people, like all others, are entitled include the right to civil and religious liberty for all without distinction,

Mindful also of the distinctive cultural and religious heritage of the people of Tibet and of the autonomy which they have traditionally enjoyed,

Gravely concerned at reports including the official statements of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, to the effect that the fundamental human rights and freedoms of the people of Tibet have been forcibly denied them,

Deploping the effect of these events in increasing international tension and in embittering the relations between peoples at a time when earnest and positive efforts are being made by responsible leaders to reduce tension and improve international relations,

1. Affirms its belief that respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is essential for the evolution of a peaceful world order based on the rule of law;

2. Calls for respect for the fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life.

The above resolution was the last completed action by the United Nations on the Tibetan problem. Unfortunately the UNGA failed to get around to the topic in last year's Assembly. It is possible that under the strain of more pressing items on the current agenda, Tibet may once again fall off the end of the agenda. The United States, in concert with the co-sponsors, will attempt to preclude this. The co-sponsors will push for a resolution similar to the one adopted in 1959, with the addition of some reference to self-determination. The fact remains that the item is on the current agenda and only 14 nations sought to avoid debate.

(2) Tibetan Exiles Lay Ground Work for Democratic Government: In July of this year the Dalai Lama, together with his advisors and representatives of all Tibetan groups in exile, prepared a draft declaration of principles for a constitutional government in Tibet. The declaration is currently being discussed and reviewed by the Tibetan peoples in India and Nepal where it is estimated that 65,000 Tibetans have sought exile since the Chinese Communists crushed their revolt in 1958. The declaration envisions an executive branch consisting of the Dalai Lama and his cabinet, a popularly chosen bicameral legislature and an independent judiciary. It also includes provision for popular removal of the Dalai Lama from either of his positions as head of state or church. It further provides for more popular control over the regencies which have plagued Tibet at times with autocratic rule during inter-regnums. The Dalai Lama hopes the declaration will be finalized in time to permit its circulation among UNGA delegates at the current Assembly session.

(3) Tibet to Hold "Democratic Elections": On 10 August 1961 the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that at a 2 August meeting of the Standing Committee of the Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region a resolution was approved calling for "democratic elections in certain selected areas of the Tibetan region." The resolution noted that

"democratic elections should be conducted in areas where conditions are favorable." "To carry out this task properly the Standing Committee has decided to conduct democratic elections in certain areas throughout Tibet during the third quarter of 1961, based on the actual conditions of Tibet and in accordance with the election law of the People's Republic of China and the directive governing basic-level elections issued by the central election committee on 3 April 1953, so that experiences can be obtained to provide better guidance to elections throughout the Tibet region in the future." It is noted that the third quarter of 1961 is now behind us and we have not seen any mention of elections having taken place in selected areas of Tibet during the period. 25X1C10B

Guidance: In all areas we utilize the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China has decided to conduct democratic elections in certain areas throughout Tibet during the third quarter of 1961, based on the actual conditions of Tibet and in accordance with the election law of the People's Republic of China and the directive governing basic-level elections issued by the central election committee on 3 April 1953, so that experiences can be obtained to provide better guidance to elections throughout the Tibet region in the future.

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9 October 1961

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442. The Norwegian Elections - A Political Lesson

Background: On September 11, in a national election, the Norwegian Labor Party lost the absolute majority it had held in the 150-man National Storting (parliament), dropping from 78 to 74 representatives. The Labor party lost 19,260 votes, costing the party four seats. This setback is specifically attributed to the inroads made by a new splinter group, the Socialistic Folk Party, formed mainly by dissident Laborites, campaigning on an anti-Nato, anti-foreign bases, anti-nuclear weapons platform. Basically, however, the loss of control can be attributed to the failure of the Norwegian Labor Party to evoke any real interest in the election or to challenge the chorus of critical voices from minor groups which were heard and listened to only because neither the Labor Party nor any other major political group spoke out on current issues with a loud, clear voice. This is not a solitary case. In Denmark, in the 1960 parliamentary elections, a splinter group which had broken away from the Communists, led by Aksel Larsen, former CP Chairman, took eleven seats and 149,482 votes, wiping out regular communist representation and emerging as a new influence in Danish politics. As Jorgen Schleimann, writing in the New Leader, said: "Larsen's success may be explained in part by the fact that the electorate showed it was sick of the depersonalized politics of the welfare state. Ideological conflicts tend to lose their significance in a political situation which lacks extremes, as has been true of Denmark for generations." He might have added that the same is true when political parties, too long in power, no longer consider it necessary to rely upon vote appeal, but depend for their support upon carrot-and-stick techniques applied through the ruling bureaucracy.

Any political party, be it of the right, left or center, and clearly even including every Western European Communist Party, must, if it is to wield power - or even to survive politically, meet this challenge. In Austria, in Belgium, in Italy, we have government by coalition because no single political party has been able to meet the demands of a majority of the electorate, or to coalesce their demands behind its platform. In Finland there is a minority government by sufferance.

In totalitarian regimes, popular demands are controlled through police methods and the ruling group maintains itself power through the exercise of an absolute power monopoly. In parliamentary democracies, the ruling group must not only be responsive to popular opinion, it must be ready and able to meet public challenge in open electoral contest. Splinter parties and the protests they represent may not of themselves be significant, but they are indicative of popular restiveness and when projected into a political vacuum or stalemate can exercise political influence or power far in excess of their actual size. The political history of post-war Western Europe is replete with illustrations of this truth.

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443. Fifth Anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution

Background: It is difficult to summarize the reasons why the popular revolt which took place in Eastern Europe in the autumn of 1956 occurred in Poland and Hungary rather than elsewhere. However, a number of historic, ethnic and geographic factors are involved which it may be helpful to mention briefly. First of all the Hungarian people, like the Poles, are people who take their religion seriously, and who are probably able to express more clearly their contempt for the ideology of historical materialism as well as for the methods of its adherents than the people of the orthodox countries where religion has traditionally acted as an adjunct of the regime. Geographical factors are also important in analyzing the extreme form of resistance which took place in Hungary: the country borders on a neutral and friendly Austria to the West and the independent communist state of Yugoslavia to the south. On another level, we should remember that the repressive tactics of Rakosi and Gerö had prevented a controlled and moderate thaw; that both Poland and Hungary, as opposed to the other Bloc countries, had more "liberal" and popular communist leaders "in reserve" around whom they could rally. Finally, while it is important to recall that it was the communist intellectuals and students who began and who led the resistance movements in both Hungary and Poland, the main strength was drawn from the workers - the supposedly dependable element of any communist party.

On 23 October 1956, tens of thousands of Hungarians led by writers and students, staged a massive demonstration expressing their support for the "Polish October" fight for freedom and asking for similar concessions in Hungary. They demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on Hungarian territory, the installation of a new government under the leadership of Imre Nagy, free elections and return to the multi-party system. Later when the Hungarian Security Police fired on a Hungarian crowd, killing a number of men, women and children, fighting broke out in earnest and even the appeal of newly designated, popular Premier Imre Nagy was powerless to stop the fighting between the people and the hated Security Police. Soviet tanks and troops were then ordered to fight and populace, but the determination of the people and the fact that a large number of Hungarian soldiers joined the revolutionaries, confused the situation and induced the Soviets to start the withdrawal of some of their units from Hungary on 29 October.

On 30 October Premier Nagy announced that the government had abolished the one-party system and re-constituted itself on the basis of a coalition of Hungarian parties, including representatives of the Smallholders (Peasants') Party and the Social Democrats, as well as the Communist Party. Later that day Mikoyan and Suslov, who had come to Hungary, told Imre Nagy's government that they accepted Hungary's demands. The following day Pravda stated that Soviet troops would be recalled from Hungary. As a matter of fact, a large scale withdrawal of the Soviet Army had already begun.

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On 31 October, Premier Nagy stated that he had never asked for Soviet troops, demanded immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops, and withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw pact. The next day Premier Nagy called on Soviet Ambassador Andropov and told him that new Soviet troops were entering Hungary. He demanded that these troops be withdrawn at once and sent a telegram to the UN Secretary General asking that the question of Soviet troops in Hungary be put on the UN General Assembly agenda. On 2 November Premier Nagy complained to the UN that the USSR was sending heavy troop reinforcements into Hungary and that Soviet troops had closed off access from Budapest to Austria and surrounded key urban areas. On 4 November before dawn the Russian and Mongolian forces attacked in full force and Premier Nagy broadcast his last appeal for help before Budapest fell.

Noteworthy items to be stressed in articles on the Revolution:

It should be pointed out that the Israeli-French-British attack on Egypt began on 29 October 1956, and it was undoubtedly this imbroglio of the West together with pressure by the Communist Chinese regime (as the Chinese themselves subsequently boasted), which induced the Soviets to reverse their decision on 31 October and begin to send their new tank units and troops back into Hungary to crush the revolt. There are many eyewitness reports regarding refusal of Soviet troops to fire on Hungarians, and the Soviet withdrawal of old units, which had been stationed in Hungary, and their replacement by new Mongolian troops who were told that they were going to defend the Suez Canal (Danube River) from the attacks of the Anglo-American imperialists. Some of these reports can be found in the book "The Hungarian Revolution (White Book)" pages 65, 71, 90, 102, 112, 119, 201, 202, 223, 251, 259.

By far the greatest bulk of the Freedom Fighters were youths and workers - the very two classes of people who could least be accused of being reactionaries, Fascists, Nazis, Horthyites or influenced by any motives other than patriotism and the desire for freedom and a decent economic future within a framework of genuine democratic socialism.

The Hungarian Revolution also revealed the latent opposition of the Russian people to the policies of the CP of the Soviet Union. Aleksandr Yurievich Kasnacheyev, a member of the Soviet Intelligence Service who defected on 24 June 1959, revealed that during and after the Hungarian Revolution there were outbursts from students in the Soviet Union protesting the Soviet aggression against the Hungarian people. Specifically, about 1000 students at the University of Moscow adopted a unanimous resolution which was sent to the Communist Party of the USSR. In addition to the protest in behalf of Hungary, this resolution demanded the cessation of jamming of foreign broadcasts, free distribution of the foreign press and the introduction of the two-party system. At other Komsomol meetings, silent demonstrations took place after Hungarian students in the USSR revealed what had happened in Hungary.

It should also be noted that the West, especially the U.S. has given priority importance at the UN to "The Question of Hungary" and has repeatedly urged action on condemnation of the Soviet aggression in Hungary, championed the right of the Hungarians to chose their own government, withheld a decision

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25X1010B EAST GERMANY: Internal Situation

Background: All reports about developments inside Communist East Germany since the borders against West Berlin and West Germany were tightly closed on 13 August confirm that (a) the Ulbricht regime was only waiting for this closing of all "escape hatches" to apply the full power of terror against its recalcitrant population, and (b) tension inside East Germany is mounting.

Principal actions of the Communist regime have been thus far:

1. Military mobilization. The Volkskammer ("people's chamber"), East Germany's pseudo-parliament voted for Ulbricht virtually unlimited emergency powers, ominously resembling Hitler's "enabling act" of 1933. Armed forces are being expanded rapidly, notably by pressing all students either to "volunteer" for army service or face expulsion from all higher education. There are some indications, however, that the "volunteer program has not yielded the desired results and yet the regime still holds back on full conscription possibly in fear against making weapons and training available on a large scale.
2. Political Persecution. Many thousand political suspects, including those accused of planning westward flight, or having assisted the flight of others, or of grumbling against government measures, have been jailed, in addition to the at least 9,000 political prisoners East Germany held before 13 August, including many kept since the 17 June 1953 uprising.
3. Compulsory Labor Measures. Inhabitants of East Germany are now subject to labor conscription, including forced transfer to farms or to factories and mines in distant provinces. This is primarily practiced against the over 50,000 workers previously employed in West Berlin. A general increase of labor "norms" (i.e. prescribed minimum output for every worker) and lengthening of working hours, especially on farms is also under way.
4. Evacuation of Border Areas. Entire city blocks in East Berlin, adjoining the Western border, and houses and villages throughout East Germany, close to the border, are being demolished, to prevent escapes (and to facilitate Communist military action). Not only their inhabitants, but any other "suspects" are arbitrarily resettled eastward, often away from Berlin and the major cities.

It is yet too early to predict reactions of the East German population. The abrupt increase in Communist terror, the openly displayed sadism of the secret police and of the "goon squads" of the Communist youth league, etc.

may lead to outbreaks of despair, even to strikes or revolts (though there is not yet any positive indication of such outbreaks). On the other hand, the bitter lesson of the abortive uprising of 1953, the apparent inability of the West to prevent the sealing of the borders, the arrogant display of daily increasing military and police power, etc. may make many East Germans feel that they have been "written off" by the West (even by West Germany) and may induce them to accept their fate with apathy and resignation, thus facilitating Ulbricht's and Khrushchey's grand design.

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obviously irrelevant).

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ADDENDUM

Item #439 - See Bi-Weekly #102, Communist Infiltration of Cuba's Revolutionary Government, and #433, Castro's Cuba - Socialist or Communist

Item #440 - See Bi-Weekly #428 and #429.

Attachment: Statements of Cousins, Pauling, Sane
and

Soviet Nuclear Testing Confuses and Upsets
Pacifists and Fellow-Travellers"

Item #438 - Attachment: Lend Lease Support to the Soviet War Effort,
1941-1945

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- 442. The Norwegian Elections - A Political Lesson - B.
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Attachment to Item # 438

Lend Lease Support to the Soviet War Effort, 1941 - 1945

Immediately after the Nazi attack, and in spite of the British need for supplies for themselves, Churchill began sending shipments of planes, tanks, and rubber to the USSR. American aid to the Soviet Union began before Pearl Harbor, and from 1 October 1941 to 31 May 1945, 2,660 ships departed for the USSR, carrying 16,529,791 tons of American supplies; of this, 15,234,791 tons arrived, 52 ships being diverted to the U.K., and 77 ships sunk. (A Soviet brochure published in 1953 went to the length of alleging that the Allies deliberately sabotaged lend lease by divulging the dates and routes of convoys to the Nazis, supposedly in order to "prove" by shipping losses "that dangers connected with the shipment of goods to the USSR were too great, and on this pretext to curtail the already miserable supplies.") The total value of American and British wartime shipments was nearly \$13,000,000,000 for comparison, (U.S. exports to all countries in 1940 amounted to \$4,000,000,000). The British share of this figure was about \$1,800,000,000. British and American deliveries in the first year of shipment included 3,052 planes, 4,084 tanks, 30,031 vehicles, and 831 tons of other supplies; thus twice as many tanks were supplied that year as the Soviets had left after the Nazi initial attack. Following a presidential order of 7 March 1942, the USSR was given preference in the allocation of American munitions over all other Allies, and even over U.S. forces. Total U.S. deliveries included 427,284 trucks, 13,303 combat vehicles, 35,170 motorcycles, 2,328 ordnance service trucks, 2,670,371 tons of petroleum products, 4,478,116 tons of food, and 1900 steam locomotives. The words "Willys" and "Studebaker" entered the Russian language. General John R. Deane has written that in July 1944 American trucks were the only kind the Soviets were using for convoy work, and since American food apparently went entirely to the military, he has estimated that, assuming an average Red Army strength of 12,000,000, "the food sent to Russia was sufficient to supply each man with more than one-half pound of fairly concentrated food per day." In other words, the Soviet army might have continued to exist without Western support, but it would never have gotten to Berlin without it, despite the sacrifices of Soviet soldiers.

Oslo, Sep 12 (Reuter) The Communist MP, Mr. Gottfred Hoelvold, who ran in the north Norwegian county of Finmark, blamed the latest Soviet nuclear tests - one of which took place less than 650 miles from the Norwegian coastline - for his defeat. He said he had been "bombed out of the Storting by Mr. Khrushchev".

STATEMENT BY DR. HANS A. BETHE, PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, CORNELL UNIVERSITY FOR BROADCAST OVER RADIO LIBERTY - 10 SEP 1961

I was deeply disappointed by the announcement by the government of the USSR of resumption of nuclear weapons tests. By today, at least four tests have already been carried out, all of them in the atmosphere.

The cessation of nuclear weapons tests was, for the last three years, mankind's best hope to achieve disarmament and thereby a more peaceful world. I have personally worked hard towards this goal of the permanent cessation of tests under adequate control, and so have many of my fellow scientists. In fact, just three years ago when a group of scientists from Russia, the US, Great Britain, and five other countries met to find out whether and by what means nuclear tests could be detected, this conference achieved a spirit of mutual cooperation: technical questions were tackled dispassionately and the conference concluded with a very hopeful statement on the problem of detection and control.

There is general agreement that the cessation of nuclear tests in itself would be only a small step toward disarmament. But it would be a definite step and we all hoped that it would soon lead to other steps of arms reduction so that ultimately we might arrive at general and total disarmament, which Chairman Khrushchev declared to be his goal. We must learn to live without brandishing ever more terrible weapons, and learn that it will bring greater security to each nation if all nations abandon certain weapons rather than acquire them. This constitutes reversal of a military tradition as old as mankind. It can therefore not be done suddenly, in one big move, but must be done gradually. Only in this way can we ensure what Chairman Khrushchev stated also as his principles: "We want to ensure equal terms for all nations during disarmament, so that no one can ever take advantage of disarmament to gain advantages for himself, to the detriment of the security of other nations."

To work out the system of controls for nuclear test cessation, diplomatic and scientific representatives of the USSR, the US and Great Britain have met for nearly three years. For the first two years these negotiations were quite successful, both sides made many concessions, and it seemed that agreement was approaching. In fact, I believe, that only by such careful negotiations in which every point is discussed in detail, and the wishes of both sides are taken into account, can we reach lasting agreements on any important matter between East and West. The greatest value of the negotiations for the test ban lay, to my mind, in this process of learning to give and take, to compromise and agree. By resuming tests, the USSR has now told us that all the good will and understanding generated by the negotiators and all their detailed work was wasted effort.

A particular disillusionment to American hopes was that just at the time when the US was determined to pursue the test ban negotiations with increased vigor, the USSR put up new and major obstacles to agreement. Our new President, Mr. Kennedy, is deeply devoted to peace and disarmament and sought agreement on test cessation if at all possible. The US made new concessions to meet political demands of the USSR: for instance the US proposed that there should be as many representatives from the USSR on the Control Commission as from the US and Great Britain combined. The USSR, however, at this point withdrew its previous agreement to many of the important provisions of the treaty and instead proposed changes which would have made effective control of the agreement impossible. I am particularly shocked that the Russian Government chose to make agreement on a treaty impossible just at the time when the US made its most sincere effort to conclude the treaty.

It must be remembered that the USSR was the first country to propose cessation of nuclear tests officially, in 1955. This proposal was to her credit, and was much welcomed by many scientists in the Western World. All the more is it a great disappointment to us that the USSR has now killed its own proposal by resuming tests. This is a bad omen for the future: What use is it to believe present and future Russian proposals for peaceful settlements and disarmament if she

abrogates her own proposals to suit her convenience?

Now that the USSR has resumed testing we are far worse off than we were before the negotiations in Geneva started. Many countries will now feel free, and in fact an urgency, to develop and test nuclear weapons --- the Chinese Peoples' Republic, Germany, Israel, Egypt, and many others. While the great powers, particularly the US and USSR, know very well how terrible nuclear weapons are, and will therefore be very reluctant to use them, this may not be so clear to the smaller powers who may feel that they have less to lose and more to gain by war than the greatest powers. A most dangerous situation has been created. A great hope of mankind to approach a more peaceful world has been destroyed.

NORMAN COUSINS, EDITOR SATURDAY REVIEW - RL TELEPHONE INTERVIEW

QUESTION: Would you tell our listeners in the Soviet Union how you feel about the Soviet decision?

Norman Cousins: I have, as you know, many friends in the Soviet Union. I've had an opportunity on several occasions to see the Soviet Union and to discuss problems at length with distinguished Soviet citizens. At both the Dartmouth conference and the Crimea conference that took place some months ago, one thing that impressed me particularly was the emphasis that my Soviet friends place on the dangers of nuclear testing. They made two points, both of which seemed to me to be most valid. One point was that, if testing is resumed, then it will be impossible to keep nuclear weapons from spreading to many nations -- Germany, Sweden, Argentina, The Peoples Republic of China, and so forth. They felt that there was one place we could take hold. The second danger that they foresaw was that it would be impossible to stop the runaway nuclear arms race unless you took hold at this point, which is to say unless you had a ban, a workable ban, on nuclear testing. Consequently, I read with the most profound sense of sadness and apprehension, the announcement of the Soviet Union that it will unilaterally resume nuclear testing.

QUESTION: How do you feel about the role of the U.N. in this?

Cousins: I can think of very few things that have happened since the end of the war that represent as much of a blow to true lovers of peace all over the world as the decision to resume nuclear testing. In the United States we did everything we possibly could to persuade our government not to resume testing. Now that the Soviet Government has announced that it will resume testing, it seems to me that people all over the world should express their opinion and, before it is too late, ask the Soviet Union to reconsider this move.

-- You now asked about the United Nations. I would hope that the United States -- I'm speaking as an American now -- I would hope that the United States would take this issue before the United Nations in an attempt to have world public opinion become articulate on this great issue.

DR. LINUS PAULING SPEAKS OVER RADIO LIBERTY TO THE PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION - RECORDED FOR EXCLUSIVE BROADCAST

I am Linus Pauling, Professor Linus Pauling, in California. I am a member of the Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of the USSR, of the Soviet Union. This is a great honor, and I am proud to be an honorary member of the Akademiya Nauk.

Today I learned that it has been reported by TASS News Agency that the USSR has made the decision to resume the experimental tests of nuclear weapons and to create a series of gigantic nuclear bombs with yields of twenty, thirty, fifty and one hundred megatons of TNT. One of these bombs can destroy any city in the world and kill millions of people. Speaking for scientists all over the world, I strongly urge that the Soviet government reconsider this decision to resume the

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testing of nuclear weapons and to expand its nuclear arsenal. The militaristic act of resuming the testing of these terrible weapons of mass destruction and death would be a dreadful blow to peace and morality and to the hope of people all over the world for achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament.

If the Soviet Union were to resume the testing of nuclear weapons, there is no doubt that the United States would also initiate further tests of nuclear weapons and that more and more nations would, in the next few years, develop stockpiles of these weapons. How could we then continue to hope that world destruction could be averted? The stockpiles of nuclear weapons that are now in existence are great enough to destroy our civilization and perhaps even to bring an end to the human race. There is no defense against nuclear weapons that cannot be overcome by increasing the scale of the attack. There is no way of limiting war between great powers to the use of small nuclear bombs when great bombs exist and the great governments are unrestrained in their militarism. I strongly condemn the militaristic actions of any government that increase the danger of war and make it harder to achieve general and complete disarmament and peace throughout the world. If the Soviet government were to resume the testing of nuclear weapons or if the American government were to be the first to resume the testing of nuclear weapons, this action would be a militaristic action of this sort. I urge that the Soviet Union not embark upon this program and that, in the meantime, a penetrating discussion of the great world problem of the existence of nuclear weapons and the need for disarmament through international agreement be initiated in the United Nations.

The discoveries of scientists during past decades have made it possible for us to envisage a world in which human beings can live happy and productive lives, free from the major part of the misery of man's natural condition. In the name of science, I ask that the Soviet government reconsider its decision and exert its great influence in the struggle for peace rather than in the preparation for catastrophic war.

This is Linus Pauling, speaking from Pasadena, California.

SOVIET NUCLEAR TESTING CONFUSES AND UPSETS PACIFISTS AND
FELLOW-TRAVELLERS

"Eighteen days before the Russians resumed nuclear testing, Soviet and Chinese Communist delegates voted unanimously at a conference in Tokyo for a resolution stating:

'THE FIRST GOVERNMENT TO RESUME TESTS SHOULD
BE DENOUNCED AS THE ENEMY OF MANKIND.'

The resolution [sic], adopted by the Seventh World Conference Against Nuclear Bombs, also stated that 'a country that resumes nuclear tests is trampling on the hopes of all peoples of the world and is an enemy of peace and will lead the way to war.'"

(The Washington Post, 24 Sep 61)

CPYRGHT

Background

During 9-14 August 1961 Gensuikyo (the Communist-dominated Japan Council Against A and H Bombs) held in Tokyo its 7th "World Conference." The series of conferences began in 1955, on the 10th anniversary of the first A-bomb (and as a result of a signature campaign against nuclear weapons conducted by housewives in protest of the 1954 Bikini incident). Although Gensuikyo had started with a broad organizational base, including distinguished individual memberships, the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) had quickly infiltrated the group and succeeded in controlling it. By 1959 (and Gensuikyo's 5th Conference) most non-leftist elements had withdrawn from active participation, and in 1960 the city of Hiroshima--in which the earlier conference had been held--withdrew its cooperation and support, thus forcing Gensuikyo to hold its 6th Conference in Tokyo; at this penultimate Conference the delegates discarded any remaining pretense of non-partisanship.

At the 7th Conference in 1961, from among foreign delegates representing 27 countries, 15 came from the USSR, 12 from Communist China and 14 from the U.S. Moscow Radio broadcast a Khrushchev message to Gensuikyo:

"...We will accept any system of disarmament control if the West agrees to our plan for general and complete disarmament. The USA and its allies evade agreement. They are stepping up war preparations.... Soviet people respect the Japanese peoples' struggle against foreign military bases and the nuclear menace."

On 9 August, the first day of the 3-day preparatory sessions, greetings were given from Genuikyo Chairman YASUI, SOHYO (labor federation) Chairman IWAI, representatives of "A-bomb victims associations" in Japan, and from well-wishers abroad.

Speeches by Delegates

Speaking for the American delegation, Dr. Corliss LAMONT--professor at Columbia University, author, philosopher, and long a friend of the Soviet Union--stated that:

"...the United States bears a heavy responsibility for the present critical international situation extending throughout the earth..."

The chief Soviet delegate was Dr. Ye. M. ZHUKOV, a member of the Soviet Peace Committee and of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, as well as Academician-Secretary of the Historical Sciences Department in the USSR Academy of Sciences. During the seven minutes allotted for speaking he remarked

"...What then, is the Soviet Union opposed to? It is pretesting firstly against the exclusion of the underground testing of nuclear weapons from the agreement, and secondly against using the control system as a means of spying into the territory of other countries. It is obvious that this would not be carried out for the purpose of peace, but would be aimed directly at preparations for war.

If the agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons test is the first step to the actual advancement for the solution of this problem, then it will be signed. We should firmly keep in our minds that this agreement does not solve at all the problem of elimination of the menace of a nuclear war, and that the problem will be solved only by total and complete disarmament.

....As is well known, the negotiations in Geneva by the three big powers on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests are at a deadlock. Who is responsible for this? This is the responsibility of certain circles of the U.S. and England who are trying to avoid the actual prohibition of the tests and who justify themselves by saying that the Soviet Union is obstinate."

The head of the Communist Chinese Delegation was Prof. CHOU Pei-Yuan, Deputy of the People's National Congress, Vice-President of Peking University and President of the China Physical Society. His lengthy speech exceeded the time allotted for it, but only referred to the (integral) nuclear question as follows:

"...Our Government and people have consistently stood for the prohibition of the tests, production, stockpiling and use of all nuclear weapons. We actively support the proposals made and measures taken by the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries for general disarmament, prohibition of nuclear weapons, liquidation of foreign troops and disbanding of military blocs.

....In order to ensure peace in Asia and the world, our Government has more than once proposed that the countries of Asia and those bordering on the Pacific, including the United States, conclude a peace pact of mutual non-aggression, and make this region an atom-free zone.... But for the outright rejection by the United States, this proposal would have become a reality and it would have been possible to turn the Pacific Ocean literally into an ocean of peace."

The Conference Sessions

During the remainder of the preparatory sessions, deliberations on the draft agenda for the Plenary Conference arose, with the Asian-African group insisting that it was impossible to divorce peace movement problems from colonialism and military alliances. After debate on Berlin and other international problems, the pro-Communist faction succeeded in inserting into the keynote Conference report the amendment that the "imperialist war-loving aggressive character of the Kennedy administration" had assumed "anti-democratic policies, which oppress the peace movement." In presenting the keynote report approved by the Preparatory Committee, Chairman YASUI reported that: "During the discussion it was re-affirmed that the movement against atomic and hydrogen bombs is motivated by pure humanitarianism, and established that under the existing circumstances, the humanitarianism underlying the movement is seen in the movement's active participation in politics, always alert to the danger of war, in order to bring about a total ban on nuclear weapons." The keynote report was delivered 12 August before an audience of some 6,000 persons plus the "peace marchers" who had converged on Tokyo following several weeks treks from various points in Japan. Speaker after speaker stood up to decry "American imperialism."

Declaration, General Resolution, and Recommendation

As is usually the case, Communists and pro-Communists formed the majority in carrying out cumbersome chores (which less active Conference members were unwilling to take on) such as clerical and administrative details and the (substantively important) duty of drafting documents. Thus on 13 August the Drafting Committee of 10 (5 Japanese, 5 foreign) met at 7 p.m. and hashed out their differences until 2 a.m. the next morning. The Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) and SOHYO delegates attempted to prevent inclusion of additional political slanting to the drafts but failed. The pro-Communist faction succeeded in steamrolling the Committee and, on the following evening, Chairman YASUI announced that the Conference had unanimously adopted texts which included the following:

A. Declaration of the Conference (as reprinted in the Communist Party paper, Akahata, 16 August 1961)

"The nuclear war position built up around America is being reinforced in West Germany, in Europe, and in Japan in the Far East, and in fact everywhere all over the world. Nuclear armaments and the construction of missile bases are making headway. With such a trend, there is a sinister move in America for the resumption of nuclear tests.

...In such a situation, the 7th World Conference opened in the capital of Japan, Tokyo, under a banner calling for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs and for the promotion of total disarmament. Ten thousand delegates from all over Japan and 110 delegates representing 27 nations and 8 international organizations attended this Conference with a strong will and determined attitude that no military provocation will be permitted any place in the world and that the resumption of nuclear testing will not be permitted in whatever circumstances."

B. General Resolution of the Conference (as reprinted in Akahata, 17 August 61)

"While confirming the fundamental correctness of our movement indicated in various documents adopted at the past six World Conferences, and at the same time with a view to frustrating the counteroffensives of the policy of force on the strength of past achievements, and in order to realize the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen bombs and total disarmament, we set forth the common goals mentioned below, consolidate the powers of all nations aspiring for peace, and march ahead with strengthened solidarity.

1. There are at present strong signs in America of a move for the resumption of nuclear tests, while the French Government, ignoring world public opinion, has continued its own nuclear tests. We should never permit nuclear tests. Differences of opinion about the conclusion of an agreement should not be allowed to be made an excuse for resuming nuclear tests. If tests are resumed now, they will touch off a dangerous test race, and it is clear that they will spur on a nuclear arms race. The first Government to resume tests today should be impeached as the enemy of peace, the enemy of mankind."

(NOTE: 8 additional "common goals" were given after this first)

C. Conference Recommendations on International Common Action for Promotion of Total Disarmament and For Prohibition of Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Draft)

"...II. For prevention of Resumption of Nuclear Weapons Tests and Conclusion of a Test Ban Agreement.

In view of the fact that there are moves inside the U.S. Government and army circles, to resume nuclear tests, and that the French Government has not abandoned its plan to continue tests in the Sahara, we call upon

the peoples of the world to do their utmost to prevent the resumption and continuance of nuclear tests.

... To achieve these purposes, we call on the peace forces of the world to focus world-wide united action at the time of the General Assembly of the UN in September and October, to which they are urged to send their petitions in every possible form, including letters and telegrams, both to the UN and the governments of the countries concerned.

And if, unfortunately, the resumption or continuance of tests should take place, the country or countries concerned must be denounced as the enemy of peace trampling on the wishes of the people of the world and preferring the path of war."

The Aftermath: Reaction of Gensuikyo

"Tokyo, Aug. 31 (AP) -- ... Another leftist group, the Japan Council Against Atom and Hydrogen Bombs, called the Russian decision 'extremely regrettable, coming as it does in the midst of an already tense world situation.'"

"Singapore, Sept. 5 -- ... The only organization, apart from the so far silent Communist Party, that strangely enough does not seem wholly opposed to the Soviet atomic testing, is the pro-Communist Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, known as Gensuikyo. Its chairman, Mr. Kaoru Uasui, verbally announced that he would send an open letter to Premier Khrushchev but the Gensuikyo's official statement said that the extreme tension had made the Soviet action 'inevitable.'" (Hindustan Times, 7 Sep 61)

Christian Science Monitor, 12 Sep 61, from Tokyo: "Gensuikyo... had first called the Soviet decision to resume testing 'inevitable' but following the succession of reported explosions had changed to a stand opposing the tests... Kaoru Yasugi, Gensuikyo chairman, in his most recent statement said, 'If the present situation continues, it does not mean only that there will be an increased danger of radioactive fallout but it will mean an increased competition for nuclear tests among other countries.' With the swinging about of Gensuikyo, the Japan-Soviet Society remained the only organization to go on record as refusing to protest the nuclear testing."

Reaction of Delegate: Corliss Lamont

In a statement to the New York Times (26 Sep) delegate Lamont -- long a vocal critic of the U.S. stated in regard to the Soviet tests:

"I am disillusioned and critical of the Soviet Union for its apparent reversal of its good policy with respect to nuclear weapons testing. I think that their action was inexcusable."

Dr. Lamont was interviewed on the subject of his experiences in Tokyo by Casper Citron on 19 September for Long Island radio station WFRM. (The program was rebroadcast 20 September by New Jersey station WNTA, and was cited by the Washington Daily News, 21 Sep; Washington Post, 24 Sep; New York Times, 26 Sep). The following excerpts are from the interview:

CITRON: Wasn't there a resolution adopted at this conference?

LAMONT: ... We were hard-working delegates there for at least one week--ten days, I should say--and at the end of the conference, a number of resolutions were adopted. There was, in fact, quite a long statement which was hashed over and argued over by the delegates from all the different countries that were represented. And one of the most important resolutions which the American delegation supported read

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this way. Quote: The first government to resume tests should be denounced as the enemy of peace and mankind." End quote.

Now, of course, the Soviet and Chinese delegations voted for that unanimously and, in my opinion, they had no idea that the Soviet Union would be the first country to resume nuclear tests. And this leads me to think that this inexcusable Soviet action is opposed by large sections of the population within the Communist bloc and probably within the Soviet Union itself.

CITRON: Dr. Corliss Lamont, do you find that it was a shock to you that the Russian and Chinese delegates to this conference that you attended were not taken in to the extent of knowing what their government was doing in this field and, thus, signed the agreement or--not the agreement--the resolution?

LAMONT: Well, that was no particular shock to me because I realize that the Soviet and Chinese governments move along dictatorial lines. They don't try to get consent of their populations or their people for a change in their government's policy. So that such policies are not submitted in any sense to the will of the people. This is one of the great lacks in these countries, where you don't have real political democracy....

There must be reasons behind it. But the trouble is, I simply can't fathom those reasons. And it seems to me that whatever the reasons may be--Khrushchev named one, namely, that it would shock the world into negotiating on Berlin--whatever the reasons behind it, they weren't sufficient to justify this thoroughly evil action, in my opinion, of resuming tests.

CITRON: Well, now, wasn't there one popular theory which has been going around the world and the United Nations that Khrushchev could have been forced into this by the army group?

LAMONT: Well, I think that is one theory that has been advanced. But I really don't take much stock in that. I believe that in the Soviet Union the civilian government--the Communist-controlled government--is really in the saddle. It seeks advice from its military men. But I don't believe that in the last analysis they can bring sufficient pressure to govern the actions and speeches and policies of Premier Khrushchev.

Counter-Action by Ex-Delegate: Earle Reynolds

Although Sino-Soviet media comment tried to obscure the fact, many non-Communists withdrew from Gensuikyo during the 1961 Conference, and some joined a new rival group calling itself the "Second Gensuikyo."

"Even before the World Congress got under way, an American pacifist was forced to have a bitter foretaste of the strife-ridden rally, when Gensuikyo... refused to seat him as one of the five American delegates. He is no other than Dr. Earle Reynolds, well-known pacifist who sailed his little yacht Phoenix into the U.S. atomic testing grounds in 1958. Rebuffed, he commented: 'Peace cannot be achieved in an atmosphere of hate.'

The rebuff came after Dr. Reynolds spoke at a meeting in Hiroshima sponsored by another ban-the-bomb group, rival of Gensuikyo whose leader is the well-known Lenin peace prize winner Dr. Kaoru Yasui. His attendance in Hiroshima apparently was enough offense to Dr. Yasui's Gensuikyo." --Japan Times, 26 Aug 61.

"U.S. PACIFIST MAPPING PROTEST IN SOVIET PORT. Tokyo, Sept. 7--Dr. Earle L. Reynolds, an American pacifist teaching in Japan, said today that he would sail into the Soviet port of Vladivostok in protest against Moscow's decision to resume tests of nuclear weapons.

.... he had sent a telegram to Premier Khrushchev announcing his intent to sail to Vladivostok. He said that it would take about a month to get the Phoenix seaworthy and that he would be accompanied on his trip by his wife and their daughter and son." NY Times, 8 Sep 61

LONDON: A PUBLICLY EMBARRASSING 'PRIVATE' MEETING

Following months of diplomatic correspondence, J. D. BERNAL, president of the WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC), persuaded prominent non-Communists to call a conference jointly with WPC leaders. Allegedly held "on the personal initiative of Canon Collins" (London Observer, 17 Sep 61) the "private conference on disarmament and world tensions" ran from Thursday, 14 September to Saturday, 16 September, after which a statement was issued. Victor Zorza, writing in The Guardian (Manchester) of 18 September, reported:

"For the first time in the history of international 'peace' conferences Soviet delegates agreed... to deplore the action of their Government.

The Soviet delegates, who included the writers Ilya EHRENBURG and Alexander KORNEYCHUK, put their names to a resolution which stated:

'We deplore the resumption of nuclear testing and, reaffirming our attitude, we oppose war, nuclear weapons and all nuclear testing of any kind, in the atmosphere, underground, under water, and in outer space, both as intensifying preparations for nuclear war and as a danger to the health of present and future generations.

' We call on the Governments now carrying out or planning nuclear tests to halt them immediately, not to resume such testing and to come to an agreement on a permanent and controlled test ban, separately or as part of general disarmament.'

Although Canon Collins had told the meeting at the start that it was not absolutely necessary to issue a final resolution for publication, there apparently was a good deal of pressure for one coming from the majority of the 60-or-so delegates from around the world. Although the conference was held behind closed doors Zorza learned that:

"While the conference went ahead with formal speeches, the discussions about the draft took place in private and repeated meetings were held to hammer out a form of words acceptable to all. Time was given to the Russians for consultation among themselves and this might have also been used by them to consult with Moscow. It is difficult to believe that they would have a decision which deplores the action of their own Government without making the appropriate inquiries."

After fighting "an unsuccessful rearguard action" the Soviet delegates finally gave way to an unusual show of initiative by delegates from Western countries; in the end the only concession the Soviets obtained was the use of the word "deplore" in place of "condemn" -- although at first they had tried to eliminate all reference to test resumption.

The strong Western position perhaps should be credited to a British participant, Professor L. C. B. GOWER, of London University, who described the finally-agreed-on statement as "not unremarkable" in having gotten the Soviets to deplore their tests. (Times, London, 18 Sep). The wife of Canon COLLINS, Mrs. Diana Collins, who attended the conference, commented

(somewhat naively) that the sponsors' wish had not been to hold "the sort of fellow-travelling Peace Fellowship jamboree, but one held on Western initiative. It was controlled by a 'troika'--a main planning committee of three. We were surprised at the amount of common ground we found." (Sunday Times, London, 17 Sep) The US delegation was led by SANE psychologist Erich FROMM and included Dr. Linus PAULING. East German representatives were unable to get visas to visit the West, but a curious "Rehabilitation-Debut" was made by Arpad SZAKASITS, the new president of the Hungarian Peace Council. SZAKASITS, the past-war leader of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party who was responsible for merging his party with the Communists, was 1948-1950 president of Communist Hungary, after which he was sentenced to life imprisonment and frequently reported as dead.

The little-heralded "peace" conference in London was, indeed, colorful in its timing and denouement, and perhaps more will be heard in the way of repercussions.

To quote Zorza further:

"Communist sources appear anxious to minimise the significance of the event and claim that the part of the resolution concerned with nuclear tests was the first to be agreed upon....

Some of the Western delegates understand from their Russian colleagues that the resolution is to be published in the Soviet press, and they will consider it a break of faith if that is not done.

They have on so many occasions lent their names to 'peace' resolutions criticising Western policies--which were then given the widest publicity by the Soviet press and radio--that they expect 'equal treatment' on this occasion.

If this is not done, they expect to take serious steps at any comparable future meetings to find out whether the Russians are only interested in 'exploiting' such conferences for their own purposes."